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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
tection by the humanitarian doctrine and the general partiality
of juries for plaintiffs under such circumstances.
In Seaman v. Curtis Flying ServiCe30 the Appellate Division
reversed the decision of the trial court which had been based on
the ground that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine should be applied in
a case where the plaintiff's intestate was killed when the plane
in which he was a passenger was wrecked in an attempted land-
ing. Certainly the doctrine should not be applied to airplane ac-
cidents. It is true that the plaintiff is probably ignorant of the
details of flying and hence would have difficulty in pointing out
specific negligence, but too little is yet known about flying for it
to be said that accidents are solely due to negligence. Instru-
ments and flying equipment have not yet been perfected to a suffi-
cient degree to give the pilot complete control over his plane re-
gardless of atmospheric conditions.
It would be a great aid to the development of a proper legal
system if the courts would undertake to decide each case as it
arose by reference to the fundamental principles which govern
the application of the rule. It may perhaps be desirable that
under certain circumstances liability regardless of negligence
should be imposed. If so, this should be done by the legislature
rather than by the judges' permitting the jury to infer negligence
under such circumstances.
NORMAN PARKER, '34.
UNSETTLED PROBLEMS IN STATE CONTROL OF CON-
TRACTS BETWEEN PUBLIC UTILITIES AND
AFFILIATED COMPANIES
The troubles which recently have beset the tangled mass of pub-
lic utility holding companies have thrown into sharp relief the
need for further regulation of these companies. The pyramiding
of financial structures and the excessive prices paid for con-
trolling stock interests in operating utilities and other holding
companies show that somewhere there must be possibilities of
great financial returns to the groups which control a far flung
organization of local operating companies. To many of the
state commissions charged with the regulation of public utilities
it has appeared that a rich source of such revenue is profits on
contracts made by local utilities with other companies controlled
by the same interests. These contracts may be for the supply of
80 (1930) 231 App. Div. 867, 247 N. Y. S. 251. See also Sollack v. State of
New York (N. Y. Ct. of Claims, 1927) 1929 U. S. Av. Rep. 42; Osterhoust,
Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur as Applied to Aviation (1931) 2 Air L. Rev. 9.
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services, such as expert engineering, accounting or legal advice,
or for the sale or rental to the operating company of necessary
materials either manufactured or bought wholesale by the af-
filiate.
In a series of recent cases the United States Supreme Court has
undertaken to determine how far the state commissions are
bound to accept the price set in such contracts as a proper oper-
ating or construction expense. Unfortunately the opinions of the
Court in these cases have used such varied language that it re-
quires careful analysis to determine exactly what the Court meant
to decide. The first, and apparently least thoroughly considered,
of these cases was the City of Houston v. Southwestern Bell Tele-
phone Co.' This case involved the question whether the charge
of 41 per cent. of the income of the subsidiary made by the
American Telephone and Telegraph Company should be allowed
as an operating expense. In return for this payment the parent
company furnished a variety of engineering, accounting, andlegal
services and also supplied many of the instruments used by the
subsidiary. The Court ruled that the Commission must accept
this sum as a proper operating expense since the local company
had produced "much evidence tending to show that the charge
made . . . was reasonable and less than the same could be ob-
tained from other sources".
The problem was more fully and adequately discussed in State
ex rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Corn-
mission.2 Here the Missouri Public Service Commission had dis-
allowed more than half of the sum charged under the 4Y per cent.
contract on the ground that outside of the supply of telephonic
instruments on a rental basis no service was rendered thereunder
which should not have been performed by the officials of the local
operating unit. The case involved many issues and a general
order of reversal was made, but the Court clearly indicated that
the ruling of the Commission was improper.
There is nothing to indicate bad faith. So far as appears
plaintiff in error's board of directors has exercised a proper
discretion about this matter requiring business judgment.
It must never be forgotten that while the State may regulate
with a view to enforcing reasonable rates and charges, it is
1 (1921) 259 U. S. 518. The present author wishes to acknowledge his
indebtedness to two articles by Mr. David E. Lilienthal, The Regulation of
Public Utility Holding Companies (1929) 29 Columbia L. Rev. 404 and Recent
Developments in the Law of Public Utility Holding Companies (1931) 31
Columbia L. Rev. 189. A valuable note on the earlier phases of this sub-
ject appeared in (1929) 15 St. Louis L. Rev. 299.
2 (1923) 262 U. S. 276.
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not the owner of the properties of the public utility com-
panies and is not clothed with the general power of manage-
ment incident to ownership. The applicable general rule is
well expressed in State Public Utility Commission ex rel.
Springfield v. Springfield Gas and Electric Co. 291 Ill.
209, 234:
The commission is not the financial manager of the corpo-
ration and it is not empowered to substitute its judgment for
that of the directors of the corporation; nor can it ignore
items charged by the utility as operating expenses unless
there is an abuse of discretion in that regard by the corporate
officers.
Although neither Justice McReynolds, who wrote the majority
opinion quoted above, nor Justices Brandeis and Holmes, who
concurred in a separate opinion which did not discuss this point,
realized the fact, this latter case was a considerable relaxation of
the rule of the Houston case. In the Houston case the test was
competitive cost. All this case requires is good faith, without
any showing whether or not the prices are higher than the pre-
vailing market price. These cases are vitally important since
they both allow the state commissions to challenge such contract
rates, even though the conditions imposed are such that the chal-
lenge will probably be unsuccessful. If the test is merely com-
petitive price, the savings of centralized management would re-
sult in ably managed affiliates being able to undersell all com-
petitors and still make large profits. To place the burden of
proving abuse of discretion on the state commission is imposing
an almost impossible task.3
The first hint that these cases might not represent the settled
views of the Supreme Court was given in the case of United Fuel
Gas Co. v. Railroad Commission of Kentucky4 where the local
company had endeavored to conceal its profits from the extrac-
tion of natural gasoline by making a contract with a specially
organized affiliate by which the affiliate was to get 872 per cent.
of the profit. Justice Stone said:
We need not labor the point that a public service corpora-
tion may not make a rate confiscatory by the device of a con-
tract unduly favoring a subsidiary or a corporation owned by
3 The impossibility of a state commission bearing such a burden of proof
was regretfully admitted by the Wisconsin Commission (one of the most
active of state commissions). Re Wisconsin Telephone Co. P. U. R. 1925 D,
661. Treadway, The Burden of Proof in Rate Making Involving Inter-
corporate Charges (1932) 31 Mich. L. Rev. 16 discusses this point with a full
citation of the cases under this stage of the development of the law.
4 (1929) 278 U. S. 300.
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its own stockholders. . . We recognize that a Public Serv-
ice Commission under the guise of establishing a fair rate
may not usurp the function of the company's directors and in
every case substitute its judgment for theirs as to the propri-
ety of contracts entered into by the utility; and common
ownership is not of itself sufficient ground for disregarding
such intercorporate agreements when it appears that, al-
though an affiliated corporation may be receiving the larger
share of the profits, the regulated company is still receiving
substantial benefits from the contract and probably could not
have secured better terms elsewhere.
But this case is not of that class.
Justice Stone cites both of the quoted cases as authority for this
proposition without realizing their fundamental difference.
Here either test for disallowance was met. The contract was
made in bad faith and entailed charges higher than the com-
petitive cost. Although the admission that the affiliate may take
the "larger share of the profits" is striking, still the insistence
that the regulated company must receive "substantial benefits"
and the more critical tone of the whole opinion indicate that the
pendulum is swinging back towards more stringent treatment of
such contracts.
This new development culminated in the decision in Smith v.
Illinois Telephone Co.,5 handed down in December 1930. Here
the Illinois Commission had ordered a reduction of telephone
rates in Chicago. The Illinois Company had applied for an in-
junction to restrain the enforcement of this rate reduction. Here
both charges for supplies furnished by the Western Electric
Company, all of whose stock was owned by the American Tele-
phone and Telegraph Company, and charges for engineering, ac-
counting, and legal services supplied by the staff of the American
Company itself were involved. Both the Commission and the
statutory court had found that the supplies and services were
worth more than they cost, that they could not be obtained more
cheaply elsewhere, and that the contracts were made in good
faith. Both bodies had also found that the Western Electric Com-
pany did not make an unreasonable profit on the whole of its busi-
ness. The statutory court granted the requested injunction on
other grounds. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court reversed and
remanded the case for further findings, saying:
That fact [the general profit percentage of the Western
Electric Company] had evidentiary value but the finding
does not go far enough. The Western Electric not only
5(1930) 282 U. S. 133.
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manufactured apparatus for the licensees of the Bell sys-
tem, but engaged in other large operations and it cannot be
assumed or conjectured that the net earnings on the entire
business represent the net earnings from the sales to the Bell
licensees generally or from those in the Illinois Company.
Nor is the argument of the appellants answered by a mere
comparison of the prices charged by the Western Electric
Company to the Illinois Company with the higher prices
charged by other manufacturers for comparable materials
or by the Western Electric Company to independent tele-
phone companies. The point of appellant's contention is that
the Western Electric Company, through the organization
and control of the American Company occupied a special
position with peculiar advantage in relation to the manu-
facture and sale of equipment to the licensees of the Bell
system, including the Illinois Company, that is that it was
virtually the manufacturing department for that system,
and the question is as to the net earnings of the Western
Electric Company realized in that department and the ex-
tent to which, if at all, such profit figures in the estimate upon
which the charge of confiscation is predicated. We think
there should be findings upon this point...
In view of the findings both of the State Commission and
of the Court we see no reason to doubt that valuable services
were rendered by the American Company, but there should
be specific findings by the statutory court with regard to the
costs of these services to the American Company and the
reasonable amount which should be allocated in this respect
to the operating expenses of the . . . Illinois Company.
At first there was a curious tendency on the part of some com-
missions to disregard or minimize the effect of the decision in the
Smith case.6 The present view as to the meaning of this decision
has been well summarized by Mr. James C. Bonbright. "Such a
position suggests that at least a part of the benefits resulting from
a holding company should go to the consumers rather than the
investors."7
There are, however, certain problems with reference to the ap-
plication of this so called new rule which are both unsettled and of
great importance. These problems may be grouped as those
which relate to how the cost is to be found, the elements of the
cost, and the effect of a finding as to cost.
6 Re Ohio Bell Telephone Company (Ohio Public Utilities Commission
1931) P. U. R. 1931 B, 46.
7Bonbright, "Recent Developments in the Law of Public Utility Holding
Companies"-A Comment (1931) 31 Columbia L. Rev. 208.
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To find the cost of production of articles sold or of services ren-
dered to the operating company it is absolutely necessary for the
commissions to have access to the books of the affiliated company
or to force the relevant portions of these books to be put in evi-
dence before the commission. Access to the books alone is prob-
ably not sufficient, for as the Attorney General of Ohio stated
when the American Telephone and Telegraph Company invited
him to send a staff to New York to inspect the books, rather than
having the Company prepare abstracts of the books for sub-
mission to the commission, it would be a mere invitation to hunt
for a needle in a haystack.8 On the other hand the right of access
to the books is probably desirable in that it will be the most ef-
fective check to prevent the falsifying of the alleged extracts
which are submitted to the commission. It is not surprising that
the statutes passed with reference to this problem since the
Smith case all provide for access to the books. 9 In so far as these
statutes merely remove limitations upon the commissions' juris-
diction which might be implied from the language of prior laws,
they are certainly wise and desirable. Unfortunately, if the hold-
ing company is not "doing business within the state," they pre-
sent grave constitutional difficulties which are completely analo-
gous with those presented by attempts to issue subpoenas duces
tecum to similar companies.
The commission may desire information from the parent com-
pany. There is no legal difficulty in obtaining this if the holding
company is incorporated in the state where the commission is
functioning or keeps its books there.' 0 If the parent corporation,
or the affiliate whose books are desired, is a foreign corporation,
it will be impossible to secure personal service on it within the
bounds of the state, unless it is doing business in the state. It is
firmly settled that mere stock control of a company doing business
in a state does not put the holding company within the legal cate-
gory of "doing business" in the state.', For the parent company
8 Re Ohio Bell Telephone Co. (Ohio Public Utilities Commission 1932)
P. U. R. 1932 D, 33.
9 R. S. Kan. (Supp. 1931) ch. 74, see. 602 a, b, c.; N. C. Code Ann. (Michie
1931) sec. 1037 (e) ; Ore. Laws 1931 ch. 103, sec. 9; Wis. Laws 1931 ch. 183.
A similar statute was passed in Massachusetts in early 1930. C. S. Mass.
(Michie Supp. 1931) ch. 164, sec. 85. The New York statute passed at the
same time is weaker in that it contains no such provision. C. S. N. Y. (Ca-
hill 1930) Public Service Law see. 110. The new statutes are collected in a
note (1932) 45 Harvard L. Rev. 729.
10 Under such circumstances it could be served directly with a subpoena
duces tecum as would any ordinary person who might be found within the
state.
n1 Cannon Manufacturing Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co. (1925) 267 U. S.
333; Bachelor v. Maytag Co. (1930) 251 Mich. 439, 232 N. W. 194.
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to be "doing business" in the state, there must be circumstances
which would justify the disregarding of the corporate entity.12
Unfortunately the decisions have not clearly set forth what those
circumstances are; 13 but the question was squarely presented to
the Supreme Court of the United States in the Smith case and it
was ruled that there were not sufficient grounds to disregard the
separate entity of the Illinois Telephone Company so as to reach
more directly a valuation of the property of the American Tele-
phone and Telegraph Company. Certainly, if the circumstances
did not exist in so closely knit an organization as the group of
subsidiaries of the American Telephone and Telegraph Company,
then it will not exist in the more loosely organized subsidiaries
of most holding companies (provided their officials are meticulous
in observing the formalities of the corporate separation).14 In
at least one instance the local commission tried the expedient of
serving the local company and mailing a copy of the summons to
the head office of the parent organization. A federal district
court promptly granted an injunction against the enforcement
of this order.15 It is probably fair to adopt the conclusion of Mr.
Lilienthal, the chairman of the Wisconsin commission, that there
is no direct way by which a subpoena can be issued against a for-
eign holding company.' 6
However, the same result may probably be obtained by indirect
means. There has been unfortunately no court decision since the
Smith case which has expressly decided on whom is imposed the
burden of proof as to the fairness of the contract price. The
only case which specifically considered this problem arose when
it was thought that the only basis for attack was by a showing of
want of good faith (under the doctrine of State ex rel. South-
western Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission). This
decision held that good faith will be presumed and that the com-
mission must bear the burden of proof.'7 The commissions have
12 Cheney Bros. Co. v. Massachusetts (1918) 246 U. S. 147; Ruff v. Man-
hattan Oil Co. (1927) 172 Minn. 585, 216 N. W. 333.
"Cf. Douglas and Shanks, Insulation from Liability Through the Use of
Subsidiary Corporations (1929) 39 Yale L. Jour. 193.
14 Cf. State ex rel. Daniel v. Broad River Power Co. (1929) 280 U. S. 551;
State ex rel. Potter v. Michigan Telephone Co. (1929) 246 Mich. 198, 224
N. W. 438.
1' New Hampshire Gas & Electric Co. v. Morse (D. C. D. N. H. 1930) 42 F.
(2d) 490. After considerable investigation the Missouri Public Service
Commission reached the same result. In Re Utilities Power & Light Corp.
P. U. R. 1930 B, 359.
'6 Lilienthal, Recent Developments in the Law of Public Utility Holding
Companies (1931) 31 Columhbia L. Rev. 189, 206.
"7Northwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Spillman (D. C. D. Neb. 1925) 6 F.
(2d) 663. Cf. authorities cited n. 3 supra.
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uniformly acted on the view that the Smith case imposes on the
local company the burden of supporting this operating expense
by a showing of the cost of the services or supplies to the parent
company.18 This view is certainly correct in so far as it applies
to proceedings to attack an order of the commission before a
federal court. The Smith case was reversed and remanded for a
finding to be made on this subject. If a finding is to be made,
evidence must be presented, and in the nature of things the hold-
ing company alone possesses the evidence. If there is no find-
ing, there cannot be a permanent injunction. It would seem
highly illogical that the burden of proof should be on different
parties, depending upon whether the question is before a com-
mission or a reviewing court. In the course of an opinion con-
cerned partially with other matters the Supreme Court of the
United States has ruled that the local company must make "a
fair showing of the reasonableness" of such a contract price and
that it is not enough to present a mere comparison of charges
made by others for similar services.' 9 However, in this case the
holding company had also been legally served with a subpoena
and it was held proper to force it to produce evidence which would
show the cost of the service rendered. Thus, this case cannot be
cited as a binding precedent in situations in which the parent
company has not been served, particularly as it only requires the
18 California Farm Bureau Federation v. San Joaquin Light & Power Co.
(California Railroad Commission 1932) P. U. R. 1932 D, 310; Re Home Tele-
phone Co. (Indiana Public Service Commission 1930) P. U. R. 1930 D, 481;
Public Utilities Commission v. Gould Electric Co. (Maine Public Utilities
Commission 1930) 1930 D, 289; Re Dayton Power & Light Co. (Ohio Public
Utilities Commission 1930) P. U. R. 1931 A, 332; Re St. Croix Valley Tele-
phone Company (Wisconsin Railroad Commission 1929) P. U. R. 1929 B,
597. It is true that many of these cases were decided before the Supreme
Court had decided the Smith case, but these commissions were already ap-
plying the same tests, regardless of the earlier decisions of the Supreme
Court. The vital importance of what the commissions are actually doing is
shown by a survey of the cases appearing in the public utility reports be-
tween 1925 A and 1930 C. Of those involving rate making only 20 per cent.
ever reached the courts. The action of the commissions with reference to
rules of law may be summarized as follows: (1) the commission simply fol-
lows the rule as laid down by the courts, 15 per cent. of the cases; (2) the
commission feels bound to follow the rules, but criticizes the policy of the
rule, 17Y per cent. of the cases; (3) the commission says it is following the
rules, but distinguishes the instant case so as to avoid all prior rules, 55
per cent. of the cases; (4) the commission flatly rejects the rule of the courts,
12V per cent. of the cases. Note (1931) 40 Yale L. Jour. 1088.
19 Western Distributing Co. v. Public Service Commission of Kansas
(1932) 52 S. Ct. 282. The case was fought out on the issue whether the order
to the holding company was an interference with interstate commerce. It
was held that it was not.
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local company to "make a showing" of the reasonableness of the
contract price, while it specifically places on the holding company
the duty of revealing the cost basis of this price. If the doctrine
should finally be adopted that the burden of proof is on the local
company, then self-interest would force the parent company to
reveal its costs, except in cases where the amounts involved were
relatively trivial, compared to the expense of submitting such
evidence. 20
It can be truthfully urged that this indirect compulsion does
not go far enough, since the commission may desire information
when there is no rate hearing pending.21 This difficulty is obvi-
ated by the newer statutes and commission decisions in the
absence of statute, which undertake to give the commission the
power to prevent the local company from making payments to
an affiliate under such a contract. The legality of such measures
will be discussed below; but, if they are legal, then the commis-
sion can merely institute proceedings to order a discontinuance
of the payments and force the parent company to come before it
and prove the reasonableness of the contractual rate, if the parent
company desires to receive any payments under this contract.
The scope of the data which must be submitted is of the greatest
practical importance to the holding company. If the required
evidence is too detailed, it will involve great expense in its prepa-
ration and greater inconvenience because of the disorganization
of records necessary to prepare the required schedules. Perhaps
the most extreme example of such a requirement is the Montana
commission's order which requests detailed invoices for each
service, apparently requiring the absurdity of engineers, lawyers,
and accountants punching a time clock to determine exactly how
much time they devoted to each problem.22 In the course of an
inquiry into state-wide telephone rates the Wisconsin commission
issued a very sweeping request for information to be supplied by
the American Telephone and Telegraph Company and its sub-
sidiary the Western Electric Company. An idea of the mass of
material required may be given by the fact that one item was a
20 The sum involved -may be quite large and yet the holding company will
consider it better policy not to attempt to secure its allowance as an oper-
ating expense. Thus, in a case in which the evidence was submitted prior
to the ruling in the Smith case, the Laclede Gas Company made no claim for
the allowance of a management fee amounting according to exhibits filed to
$212,000 a year. State ex rel. St. Louis v. Public Service Commission (Mo.
1931) 47 S. W. (2d) 102.
21 Lilienthal, Recent Developments in the Law of Public Utility Holding
Companies (1931) 31 Columbia L. Rev. 189, 205.
22 City of Polson v. Public Utilities Consolidated Corp. (Montana Public
Service Commission 1929) P. U. R. 1929 E, 557.
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detailed statement of the manufacturing cost of each type of
item sold to the Wisconsin Company by the Western Electric
Company between the years 1916 and 1930.23 Similar requests
were made by the special master for the federal statutory court,
who was hearing evidence on a request for a permanent injunc-
tion against the enforcement of an order of the Michigan com-
mission.24 On the other hand, the Ohio commission expressly
indicated a desire to be more moderate in its demands and with
reference to the same subject only requested a general statement
of standard shop costs for each class of items. 25 As the Ohio
commission pointed out, the commissions would never finish in-
vestigating a given case if they must find every detail concerning
the business of so wide flung and diversified an organization as
the American Telephone and Telegraph Company and its sub-
sidiaries. It is probably true that the commissions could not
safely accept the sworn testimony of the officials without some
reference to the figures upon which such testimony is based, for
this testimony would be practically untested by cross-examina-
tion, since no state official would have the information needed for
an intelligent exercise of this privilege.
Granting that the commission has been able to secure the in-
formation upon which it can make a finding as to the cost of the
services and supplies, there still remains the even more vital
question as to what are the elements of this cost. The most
controversial elements are the compensation to be made for
"stand-by" services and the allowances to be made for profit.
Under the contracts of the American Telephone and Telegraph
Company and many other holding companies, the parent company
or some affiliate undertakes to answer all engineering, legal, and
accounting problems that may be referred to it. To answer
these a large and well-paid research staff must be maintained.
In one case the California commission took the view that as long
as no questions were asked, no service was rendered, and hence
no allowance should be made.26 However, the mere existence of
such a staff eliminates the necessity for the local company main-
28 Re Wisconsin Telephone Co. (Wisconsin Railroad Commission 1931)
P. U. R. 1931 E, 101.
24 Michigan Bell Telephone Co. v. Michigan Public Utilities Commission
(D. C. E. D. Mich. 1931) P. U. R. 1931 E, 222. The printed reports do not
give the full terms of the requests, but they were before the Wisconsin com-
mission when it made its order and the Wisconsin commission states that
they were substantially identical with those made by it.
25 Re Ohio Bell Telephone Co. (Ohio Public Utilities Commission 1932)
P. U. R. 1932 D, 33.
26 Re Los Angeles Gas & Electric Co. (California Railroad Commission
1930) P. U. R. 1931 A, 132.
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taining a smaller, but proportionately more costly, because less
constantly-occupied staff of its own. The allocation of the ex-
penses of this staff was one of the items in controversy in the
Wisconsin27 and Ohio 2 8 cases previously referred to. The Wis-
consin Commission was very suspicious lest the Wisconsin Com-
pany was being called upon to bear the cost of development of
discoveries which eventually became commercially saleable for
non-utility purposes, like the Western Electric Movietone. It
would seem that the fairest system of allocation of this cost would
be that proposed by the American Telephone and Telegraph Com-
pany before the Wisconsin commission, which was based on gross
income of the local companies, with an allowance out of the
profits of commercial by-products to repay the cost of their de-
velopment (apparently including also some allowance out of the
profits of commercial successes to repay sums spent on commer-
cially unsuccessful by-products).
The treatment of "profits" in such contracts presents even
greater difficulties. Much of this difficulty is due to loose termi-
nology. For instance the California Commission says that it is
firmly committed to the policy of not allowing profits to be in-
cluded in such costs and yet in the same opinion it allows a credit
of enough to give a return of 7 per cent. on invested capital 29
(which is obviously more than the true interest rate for money,
if we disregard the factor of compensation for risk-taking which
is normally considered as an element of profit rather than of
interest) .30 It is certainly true that in so far as profits are the
result of superior bargaining power, they should not be allowed
in computing costs where the independence of the contracting
parties is so nearly fictional. In the Smith case it was expressly
stated that the element of profit on goods manufactured should be
27 Re Wisconsin Telephone Co. (Wisconsin Railroad Commission 1931)
P. U. R. 1931 E, 101.
28 Re Ohio Bell Telephone Co. (Ohio Public Utilities Commission 1932)
P. U. R. 1932 D, 33.
29 Re Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co. (California Railroad Commission
1929) P. U. R. 1930 C, 31. A similar view was followed in a federal district
court. Wabash Valley Electric Co. v. Singleton (D. C. S. D. Ind. 1932) 1 F.
Supp. 106. In a case involving the authorization of the issuance of securi-
ties, the Missouri Public Service Commission has adopted the same view.
Re Western Light & Power Co. (1931) P. U. R. 1931 C, 188. In a case in-
volving the valuation of properties of a lessee of a federal water power site,
the Federal Power Commission considered it necessary to find facts sufficient
to disregard the corporate entity to reach this same result. Re Alabama
Power Co. (1932) P. U. R. 1932 D, 345.
30 Cf. 2 Taussig, Principles of Economics (3rd. ed. rev. 1927) 164-180.
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included, but it is not clear in what sense the term was used.31
The staggering losses which Western Electric Company is cur-
rently reporting show the absolute necessity of making a large al-
lowance for compensation for the risk involved in investing vast
sums so as to be able to supply affiliated operating companies.
Let us suppose that the commission has overcome all difficulties
and discovered what is the legally correct cost of the services or
supplies furnished by the holding company to the local company.
What is the effect of this finding?
In the Smith case the United States Supreme Court merely re-
quired a finding, but did not say what effect it should have. By
reference to the language in the cases of City of Houston v. South-
western Bell Telephone Co. and United Fuel Gas Co. v. Railroad
Commission of Kentucky, it would seem that no finding as to cost
would justify the allowance of a contract price which was higher
than that for which the local company could perform the serv-
ices itself or obtain outsiders to perform them for it. It is true
that the Michigan Supreme Court in the case of State ex rel. Pot-
ter v. Michigan Bell Telephone Company expressly limited the
sum allowable to the cost of service, but this case was based on a
radically different theory in that it involved the disregarding for
some purposes of the separate entity theory, while the separation
of parent and subsidiary is expressly recognized in the Smith
case. It may well be that the Smith case is going to cause as
much confusion as the famous enumeration of the items of value
for rate making purposes contained in Smyth v. Ames. It would
seem desirable that cost be established as the maximum limit of
the sum payable.32 This view seems to be the one adopted by the
commissions in actual practice.33
It is clear that the commission can in a proper case disallow all
or part of the sum paid under such a contract in a rate case or in
a petition for the authorization for issuance of securities, but the
31 Supra p. 66.
32 Of course in each instance there must be a showing that the services
and supplies were more valuable to the local company than the contract
price. The commissions have frequently disallowed contractual charges on
the ground that no valuable services were actually rendered. City of
Loogootee v. Loogootee Water Co. (Indiana Public Service Commission 1932)
P. U. R. 1932C, 494; Re New York State Railways (New York Public Serv-
ice Commission 1932) P. U. R. 1932 D, 479; Re Warren Telephone Co. (Ohio
Public Service Commission 1931) P. U. R. 1931 E, 416. The commission may
also disallow the expense, in whole or in part, because it finds it was solely
for the benefit of the holding company. Re Salamonia Telephone Co. (Indi-
ana Public Service Commission 1930) P. U. R. 1930 E, 39; Re Pacific Tele-
phone & Telegraph Co. (Oregon Public Service Commission 1919) P. U. R.
1919 D, 345.
33 Cf. cases cited in notes 22, 23, 24, 26, and 29 supra.
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commissions have recently claimed the power to do more. Some
of the newer statutes expressly authorize the commissions either
to pass on new contracts between affiliates 34 or to order the local
company to make no payments under such a contract until the
contract has been approved by the commission.3 5 The new Wis-
consin statute86 is even broader and expressly authorizes the
commission to review its prior rulings as to the validity of any
particular contract at any time in the light of the circumstances
then pl-esent. On such a review, the commission may order that
payment be suspended. Even in the absence of such statutes,
some commissions have exercised this power.8 7 The theory back
of such rulings has been well expressed by the Alabama Com-
mission:38
We cannot conceive that it will be contended that a Com-
mission is without authority to halt a raid on the treasury
of the operating utility on the plea that it has no right in law
to manage the property. From our point of view, it is not an
assertion of management, but rather an assertion of reason-
able control over practices which the Commission has a right
to prevent and should prevent before the injury has been
done if it is possible for us to arrive there in time.
To be able to render the proper service to the public, the local
company must have good credit. It will not enjoy this if there
is even a suspicion that its earning power is being surreptitiously
diverted to the owners of the common stock. Thus it would seem
that the courts should hold when the question is fully and fairly
presented to them that the exercise of this power to stop pay-
ments is a legal exercise of the power of regulation and is not con-
34 These statutes say the commission may either approve or disapprove,
they do not specify the consequences which will follow such action. C. S.
N. Y. (Cahill 1930) Public Service Law sec. 110 (3); R. S. Kan. (Supp.
1931) ch. 74, sec. 602; N. C. Code Ann. (Michie 1931) sec. 1037 (e). The
Massachusetts statute only applies to contracts for more than tvo years.
C. S. Mass. (Michie Supp. 1931) ch. 164 sec. 85.
35 Ore. Laws 1931 ch. 103 sec. 9.
86 Wis. Laws 1931 ch. 183.87 Re New Hampshire Gas & Electric Co. (New Hampshire Public Serv-
ice Commission 1931) P. U. R. 1931 D, 225; Re Southern Bell Telephone &
Telegraph Co. (Alabama Public Service Commission 1932) P. U. R. 1932 E,
207; Re New York State Electric & Gas Corporation (New York Public
Service Commission 1932) P. U. R. 1932 E, 1. The New Hampshire Su-
preme Court has recently declared that the New Hampshire commission did
not posses the power it assumed to exercise. New Hampshire Gas & Elec-
tric Co. v. New Hampshire Public Service Commission, not yet reported.
38 Re Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co. (1932) P. U. R. 1932 E,
207.
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trary to due process of law. It must be noted that the Smith case
speaks of the "power of regulation" rather than using the nar-
rower phrase the "rate making power."
Perhaps the most hopeful solution of these tangled problems
lies in the recently adopted practices of some of the holding com-
panies themselves. In at least one case the companies voluntarily
submitted the contract to the commission, together with full data,
before any payments were made.39 Several of the Morgan group
of companies have announced that they will endeavor not to de-
rive any profit from the rendition of services to affiliated local
companies (by periodic price changes) and have set up the finan-
cial structure of the service-rendering affiliates in such a way
that any profits which may arise will be distributed back through
stock ownership to the local companies in proportion to their
gross income. 40 The commission's tasks will be made easy if such
arrangements spread, but it will probably be necessary to retain
the "big stick" of stringent regulation to see that good faith is
present. It would be all too easy for unscrupulous promoters to
divert to themselves the actual profits of the service affiliates by
the payment of excessive salaries or other forms of payment with-
out regard to service actually rendered.
GEORGE W. SIMPKINS, 33.
3, Re Nashville Gas & Heating Co. (Tennessee Railroad and Public Utili-
ties Commission 1931) P. U. R. 1932 A, 270.
40 New York Times, Nov. 15, 1932, F. 5:3.
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